This paper demonstrates that conservative aggregation in accounting often improves the overall quality of information produced, and therefore enhances the welfare of accounting information users. We study the optimal accounting policy when a …rm can control the quality of accounting information through costly and noncontractible action.
Introduction
This paper studies the e¤ect of aggregation and conservatism on accounting information quality. Aggregation refers to the practice of summarizing raw data into key …nancial measures with a limited amount of disclosure. This process involves data compression, and leads inevitably to a loss of information. Conservatism, which Sterling (1970) rates as the most in ‡uential accounting principle, is de…ned in the Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2 as "a prudent reaction to uncertainty... If two estimates of amounts to be received or paid in the future are about equally likely, conservatism dictates using the less optimistic estimate."
The combination of aggregation and conservatism introduces bias and may impair the usefulness of accounting information to decision making. Relative to the true probability distribution of the underlying economic states, a conservative accounting system generates signals that increase the likelihood of classifying …rms as being in an unfavorable state. 1 Such bias, unless it can be quanti…ed or adjusted for by the end user, runs the risk of producing misleading information. It is noted by the Financial Accounting Standards Board that conservatism "tends to con ‡ict with signi…cant qualitative characteristics, such as representational faithfulness, neutrality, and comparability (including consistency)." Similar views are expressed by Hendriksen and Van Breda 1992: "Conservatism is, at best, a very poor method of treating the existence of uncertainty in valuation and income. At its worst, it results in complete distortion of accounting data."
The above arguments focus on comparing the information quality under conservative and neutral accounting regimes, taking as given the quality of the underlying information. What's 1 As stated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board in the SFAC No.2, conservatism causes "possible errors in measurement in the direction of understatement rather than overstatement of net income and net assets." missing is the recognition that the information quality might be endogenous. This paper takes the analysis one step further. We analyze the case where the information originator, typically the …rm, covertly controls the quality of information generated at a private cost.
After the information is generated, the accounting aggregation is executed. In this situation, the accounting system not only a¤ects the quality of reported information ex post, but also the quality of information generation ex ante.
We show that conservative aggregation in accounting often increases the quality of accounting information. We model the accounting system as an information processing scheme in the presence of uncertainty. It is assumed that the …rm prefers a favorable accounting report, whereas users of the accounting information are more concerned with its accuracy for decision making. Given this divergence in preferences, we show that a conservative accounting system positively a¤ects the …rm's propensity to provide more accurate information.
This conclusion is derived from the following rationale: given that the information originator prefers to be classi…ed as having a favorable state of a¤airs, his expected payo¤ decreases with a conservative accounting system. However, this decrease is less severe when the underlying information signal is more accurate. Hence, an increased level of conservatism enhances the …rm's motivation to provide accurate information.
Understanding aggregation and conservatism is without a doubt important to the accounting profession. Our analysis brings forth one fundamental insight. By imposing conservative aggregation, the accounting system e¤ectively links the …nancial reporting outcome to the unobservable precision of the underlying information. This mechanism provides an incentive for the …rm to increase information quality ex ante, which in turn enhances the welfare of accounting information users. Through comparative statics analysis, we further show that in certain circumstances, the level of conservatism even increases with the opportunity loss of being overly prudent. This result strongly favors the adoption of a conservatively biased system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie ‡y discusses the related literature and highlights the intended contribution of this paper. Section 3 describes the basic model and analyzes the information user's primary decision problem with an exogenously …xed information quality. Section 4 discusses our major results with respect to conservatism and aggregation when the information quality is endogenously derived. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Related Literature
Our study is closely related to two areas of accounting research: aggregation and conservatism. In the literature on aggregation, it is often argued that data reduction is needed to ease information processing costs for end users (Butterworth 1972 ). This line of research often assumes that aggregation reduces overall information accuracy. Early research, for example, examines the loss in user payo¤ arising from aggregation (Ronen 1971 , Butterworth 1972 , Ijiri 1975 , Feltham 1975 ). More recently, Dye and Sridhar (2004) show how aggregate accounting reports can reduce earnings management incentives. We support this line of research by demonstrating how aggregation, which prevents investors from observing detailed data, can serve as a commitment device to achieve ex ante optimum and increase information quality.
Moreover, our analysis reveals that in order for aggregation to increase reporting quality, accounting needs to be conservative. This highlights an intrinsic link between the two important properties of accounting, namely, conservatism and aggregation. choice. Furthermore, in Chen et al. 2007 , the …rm owner bene…ts from information accuracy because it leads to more e¢ cient incentive contracts. In contrast, we study how conservatism a¤ects the quality of information used by …rm outsiders in decision making. In our setting, the …rm owner doesn't directly care about the unobservable quality of the accounting information.
In the broader context, this paper is also related to the growing literature on collective choice and endogenous information production. For example, in a committee decision setting, Li (2001) shows that by making it harder to take the committee's consensus action, each individual committee member has more incentive to increase his fact-…nding e¤orts. Both assumes that the information originator has sole control of information quality and cares only about maximizing the probability of a favorable classi…cation. As a result, in Li's model the optimal decision rule is either aggressive or conservative, whereas in ours it is strictly biased downwards.
Model Setup
Accounting information is provided by a …rm to its end users, who are assumed to be suf…ciently numerous that mutual contracting (regarding disclosed accounting data) is prohibitively expensive. We assume that an independent third party, the auditor/accountant, veri…es the existence and truthfulness of the underlying data and exactly follows an accounting process de…ned by a set of pre-speci…ed rules. However, the users and the auditor cannot control the underlying process generating the raw data, and hence cannot control the preci-sion of the raw data. This assumption allows us to neutralize factors associated with earnings management, and to focus on the issue of conservatism and ex ante information quality control.
As a reasonable abstraction of the real world situation, we assume that the users and the …rm have divergent preferences over the accounting signal. A representative user's expected utility increases with signal accuracy, whereas the …rm's payo¤ increases with the favorableness of the signal. Note that the latter assumption is easily justi…ed when the utility of the current owners of the …rm depends on its market valuation, as is typically assumed in prior literature.
We model accounting as a two-step process. In the …rst step, after nature draws the state, a signal (i.e, raw data) is obtained regarding that state. The precision of the raw data is controlled by the unobservable action of the …rm's manager. In the second step, the accounting process transforms the raw data into a …nancial report. End users then make appropriate economic decisions based on this published report.
To capture the aggregation aspect of accounting in a simple manner, we use the following model featuring binary classi…cation based on a continuous signal. 4 Speci…cally, we assume that there are two possible states of nature: x = 0 (the bad state) and x = m (the good state), with m > 0. 5 Let denote the a priori probability of x = m, which is known by both the …rm and the users. The raw information y is a noisy but unbiased signal of the state x: y = x + where is normally distributed with zero mean and precision h.
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A key notion in our paper is that the information quality h can vary. For simplicity, 4 The issues of accounting conservatism and information aggregation are closely related. Aggregation ensures that users cannot fully infer the underlying information from the accounting reports. Without such a feature, it is di¢ cult to establish any economic signi…cance for accounting when it is merely an invertible data transformation. 5 See, for example, Kwon, Newman and Suh (2001), and Gigler and Hemmer (2001) for analysis of conservatism using similar binary structures. 6 The normality assumption facilitates many mathematical derivations. However, major results hold qualitatively for any distribution function that's symmetric, unimodal and covers ( 1; +1).
we assume that h can take two values, h and h. h can be interpreted as a low level of information accuracy achieved through ordinary mechanisms such as internal control. h represents the higher level of accuracy arising from the …rm's noncontractible and costly e¤ort.
More speci…cally, with probability r, the …rm's reporting system generates y with precision h.
With probability 1 r, the signal y is of quality h. r is assumed to be at the …rm's discretion, and is unobservable.
After observing the noisy signal y = x + , the accountant produces a report z based on the data y. The accounting policy speci…es how this reporting process should be done, In other words,
where g( ) denotes the accounting rule. Assume that a representative end user takes one of two possible actions: a = a 1 or a = a 2 . a 1 is assumed to be the correct action to take when the good state (x = m) occurs, and a 2 is assumed to be the correct action to take when the bad state (x = 0) occurs. Concretely, these actions could represent banks lending (or not lending) to the …rm, or analysts issuing a buy/sell recommendation. As we will see later, this binary framework is designed to motivate information aggregation by reducing the welfare loss brought on by transforming the raw information signal y into binary summary measure z. In
Appendix B, we demonstrate how this binary setup can be generalized.
User' s primary decision problem
The decision problem of the representative end user, given the noisy accounting signal, can be formulated and solved as follows. Let U (a; x) denote the representative user's utility as a function of the state-action combination (a; x), with To illustrate the benchmark decision rule of a representative end user, consider the case where the precision of y (i.e., r) is exogenously …xed and the accounting rule is to simply report the underlying information y. That is,
We denote this benchmark accounting as R a . If the state is actually m, then = y m. If the state is 0, then = y. Let ( ) denote the density function of a standard normal variable (i.e., with mean zero and variance one). Then, by applying Bayes'rule,
Thus, the user should take action a 1 if
Note that d log
so
is an increasing function of y. Let w be the value of y such that (2) holds as an equality. The value of w can be shown to exist. 7 For any y > w ,
Therefore L 2 Pr(x = 0jy) < L 1 Pr(x = mjy), and the user will take action a 1 when z = y > w .
This threshold value of y characterizes the end user's optimal actions.
The previous analysis indicates that it is possible to reformulate the user's problem as choosing a threshold w to minimize the expected loss. For any w, let p denote the probability of correctly classifying the state as bad when the state is indeed bad (x = 0), and let q denote the probability of correctly classifying the state as good when the state is indeed good (x = m).
For a given w and r, the probabilities of correct classi…cation are: ; and (6)
where ( ) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variable. Notice that w and r simultaneously determine p and q: Hence, from the end user's perspective, the optimal 7 Existence can be demonstrated as follows using features of the normal distribution. At low values of w,
2 ) will approach in…nity, hence will approach 0 and hence
will go to in…nity.
choice of w (r) for a given r should minimize the expected loss, that is,
For a given r, the optimal classi…cation threshold w (r) satis…es the following …rst-order
The following proposition summarizes the properties of the optimal w (r) and also provides a useful benchmark for later derivations:
PROPOSITION 1 For a given r, the optimal w (r) is uniquely determined and satis…es:
(ii) When
decreases with r.
(iii) For any h and r, w (r)
PROOF. See Appendix.
The representative user's problem in choosing the optimal classi…cation threshold can be understood as follows. The user is willing to risk taking action a 1 if there is su¢ cient chance of getting the high state x = m. At y = w , the expected loss from getting the high state x = m just balances the expected loss from getting the low state x = 0. At any lower value of y < w (r), the expected loss from getting a low state when taking action a 1 outweighs the loss of getting the high state when action a 2 is taken. At at any higher value of y > w (r), 8 Throughout the paper we use letter subscripts to denote derivatives.
the expected loss from getting a high state when taking action a 2 outweighs the loss of getting the low state if action a 1 is taken. The optimal threshold w (r) generally doesn't equal m=2.
The deviation of the optimal threshold w (r) from
, and can be either positive or negative. In the special case where
, which is independent of h and h. Further, given the commonly known prior and the user's loss function, higher information quality r of the signal makes the optimal w (r) closer to m 2
. In other words, better information quality reduces the e¤ect of the prior or loss function on the
2 (0; m). To ensure that the results are easily interpretable, throughout the paper we assume
The end user's threshold-determined action strategy gives rise to the following accounting policy, which aggregates the raw data in the following way:
In other words, as an information aggregation mechanism, the accounting system takes the form of a threshold classi…cation scheme. It compares the noisy accounting signal y with a threshold w : when y is greater than w, the system reports z = m, and when y w, the system reports z = 0. In this accounting strategy, denoted R b , accountants aggregate the underlying information y into summary data, z. Such aggregation makes the end user's task easier.
Let us de…ne the expected loss of the user as a function of w for a given r as
so that the following Corollary arises:
COROLLARY 1 For any w 2 (0; m); the user's expected loss L (w; r) due to wrongful classi…cation decreases with r, that is, L r < 0.
Corollary 1 shows that the user's expected loss decreases with the …rm's e¤ort (r) in controlling the accounting information quality. As a result, it is in the end user's interest to motivate the …rm to improve accounting information quality. Next we show how a choice of accounting policy can be used to achieve this objective. We de…ne conservative, neutral, and aggressive accounting as follows.
De…nition: Accounting is conservative (neutral, aggressive) when w > (=; <)w (r).
The accounting w > w (r) is conservative because, given the precision level of the underlying signal, it is more likely to issue an unfavorable report (i.e., z = 0). 
Endogenous information quality
We assume that the …rm prefers to be identi…ed with the favorable state m. In particular, the …rm gets payo¤ S 2 when a = a 1 , and payo¤ S 1 when a = a 2 , with S 2 > S 1 > 0. This assumption is motivated by the observation that payo¤s to a …rm (or to its manager) are usually positively correlated with the perceived prospects of the …rm. 10 In our setting, for a given information quality, a higher w reduces the probability of the …rm being classi…ed into the good state and reduces the …rm's expected payo¤.
The …rm cannot bias or withhold y, but it nevertheless has control over the quality of 9 Note that conservative accounting is de…ned relative to w (r), not m=2. The deviation of w (r) from m=2
captures other causes of conservatism analyzed in prior studies, such as the asymmetric loss function of the information users. 10 Notice that conservatism, as de…ned in our model, increases the precision of good news but decreases the precision of bad news. In a more general model, it is possible that S 1 and S 2 change with the information content of the accounting report. However, the major conclusion of our paper holds as long as S 1 is less than
y through its e¤ort r that increases the possibility of the accounting signal having a higher precision h. E¤ort is costly, and the strictly convex and increasing cost is labelled kc(r) with c r (r) > 0, c r (0) = c(0) = 0, c rr > 0 8r > 0. k is a positive constant. The …rm's e¤ort and costs are not observable, and are at the …rm's discretion. Thus, given h and h, r essentially indexes the accounting information quality.
11
The timing is as follows. The accounting rule is …rst set with a …xed threshold w. The …rm then chooses e¤ort r, nature subsequently draws state x, and the noisy signal y = x + is observed by the accountant. A report z is generated based on y, the information user chooses his action based on z, and payo¤s for both parties are realized.
Information aggregation and accounting conservatism
For a given w, the …rm chooses an optimal accounting information accuracy r to solve
The sum of the …rst two terms, [(1 )(1 p (w; r)) + q (w; r)]S 2 + [(1 )p (w; r) + (1 q (w; r))]S 1 , represents the expected private bene…ts to the …rm: the probability of being classi…ed in a particular state multiplied by the corresponding payo¤. The last term is the cost of the internal control e¤ort to the …rm. As q rr = p rr = 0 and kc rr > 0, this expression is globally concave in r. Denote S 2 S 1 by S, and let B r denote the marginal bene…ts to the …rm from increasing r,
h wh 
11 Since r and c (r) are non-veri…able, binding contracts conditioned on the accuracy of the signal can not be written.
The …rst order condition for (12) is:
which is su¢ cient, as well as necessary, and admits a unique solution. 12 Again, we see the dissonance of preferences: in choosing the optimal r , the …rm equates its marginal payo¤, B r = ( q r (1 )p r ) S; with its marginal cost of e¤ort, kc r . Given that a …rm always prefers the favorable classi…cation, it may disregard the bene…ts of higher quality accounting information to the user.
Taking the derivative of B r with respect to w, we have
Therefore B rw 6 = 0 when
Thus, except for very special circumstances, the …rm's choice of information precision (r) would be a¤ected by the threshold w.
Desirability of information aggregation
Note that the information user's …rst order condition is:
Consider the case of a disaggregated accounting policy, denoted R d , in which the underlying signal y is directly disclosed. Since we assume that the number of end users is large enough so that contracting with them individually on the use of accounting information is prohibitively expensive, each user will, based on his conjecture of the unobservable r (which must be correct in equilibrium), use the ex post optimal decision rule w (r). Therefore,
However, this w is not optimal ex ante. From Corollary 1,
> 0 for any w 2 (0; m). Condition (16) further implies @r=@w 6 = 0. Therefore the ex ante optimal level w 6 = w (r).
In contrast, consider an accounting regime with aggregation (R a ) where the underlying data y is summarized into a bivariate signal z. Since only z is reported, users can no longer use the ex post optimal decision rule w (given that y is not observable). Therefore, the accounting rule R a can achieve the ex ante optimum by setting 
More formally, we have the following proposition. 
In addition, under R a , the accounting is biased in the sense that the optimal choice of the threshold w a is di¤erent from that of the ex post optimal threshold for the user's primary decision problem, w (r a ), given the …rm's induced choice of r a .
In essence, the aggregation feature of the accounting policy R a serves as a commitment device. With endogenous information quality r, accounting aggregation increases the accuracy of the raw data. This result highlights a key bene…t of accounting aggregation, which in addition to reducing information processing costs, improves the overall quality of the information..
We would like to note that, in our model, a bivariate decision setting for the representative user is used to simplify the exposition. In a more general setup, aggregation in the form of (18) will likely incur additional cost due to information loss (e.g., Ronen 1971 , Butterworth 1972 , Ijiri 1975 , Feltham 1975 ). The bene…t of aggregation due to the increase in the quality of raw data needs to be weighed against those added costs.
Accounting conservatism and information quality
An interesting aspect of the above aggregated accounting scheme is its bias. In this section we further explore the issue. PROOF. See Appendix.
PROPOSITION 3 For any …xed h, as long as
B rw > 0 implies that a higher classi…cation threshold w leads to a higher marginal bene…t of increasing r for the …rm. Given that c r is unrelated to w, from the usual comparative statics argument, the following Corollary shows that the choice of r increases with w:
COROLLARY 2 When B rw > 0, the user's optimal r increases with w, that is,
PROOF. This again follows the standard monotone comparative statics argument. Notice that total di¤erentiation of (14), the …rm's …rst order condition in choosing r , yields
Thus, when B rw > 0, a higher w leads to a higher choice of r.
When the user chooses the optimal classi…cation threshold, he takes into account the e¤ect of w on the …rm's information quality e¤ort. The following proposition shows that w is greater than the optimal ex post w (r).
PROPOSITION 4
When B rw > 0 so that the …rm's choice of information quality r increases in w, the optimal choice of the threshold level w is higher than the optimal threshold level for the user's primary decision problem, w (r), given the …rm's induced choice of r. In other words, the accounting system embodied by the threshold level w is conservative. 
where the second equality is by the symmetry of the normal distribution function. This
Therefore, when w = = 1 and B r = 0: The …rm's incentive to increase signal precision is low because, from its perspective, the increase in the probability of obtaining the favorable classi…cation is exactly o¤set by the increase in probability of obtaining the unfavorable classi…cation. So even though the user unambiguously bene…ts from more precise information, the …rm has little incentive to incorporate such bene…ts in choosing the control e¤ort r.
The situation changes if we apply a conservative accounting policy. By setting w equal to w plus a small positive deviation " > 0, such that w > w , the marginal bene…t of increasing r is positive (i.e., B r > 0). Note that under this accounting regime, report {z = 0} would be issued when signal w = m 2 is received which indicates an equal likelihood of the true state being 0 or m. That is, the accounting reports the less favorable of the two equally likely outcomes. With such a conservative accounting system, the overall probability of issuing an unfavorable report is high. The …rm, however, will have an incentive to increase signal precision since B r > 0. As a result the optimal accounting policy (w ) is conservative.
It is worth pointing out the generalizability of the above argument from binary states to multiple states. As long as it is the case that, between any two states of a¤airs, the …rm always prefers to be identi…ed with the more favorable state, a more conservative classi…cation rule will likely improve the …rm's propensity to generate more accurate information. In Appendix B, we provide a scenario with three states of nature and three decision alternatives to illustrate this rationale.
Comparative Statics Analysis
Although conservatism, as a deviation from the optimal accounting scheme given perceived information quality, can increase the incentive to improve information quality, it is costly because classi…cation is too pessimistic given the ex post information quality. A trade-o¤ needs to be made between the ex ante incentive for improving information quality and the ex post accuracy given the information quality. The optimal threshold level w must therefore be chosen to strike a balance between these two forces. Next we examine how the optimal threshold level w changes with respect to the changes in the losses associated with Type I
and Type II errors in our model.
PROPOSITION 5
When B rw > 0, ceteris paribus, the user's decision-making threshold w increases with L 2 and increases (decreases) with
When the …rm has no control over information quality, the optimal decision-making threshold w increases in L 2 and decreases in L 1 . This is a natural consequence of the fact that information users seek to balance the opportunity losses associated with Type I and Type II decision-making errors. This result doesn't necessarily hold when the …rm can control the information quality. Holding everything else constant, an increase in L 1 has two o¤setting e¤ects: On the one hand, a larger L 1 increases the loss associated with a Type I error (i.e., being overly cautious and misclassi…ying the …rm as being in the bad state when the state is actually good), and hence tends to decrease the decision-making threshold. On the other hand, because @L @r increases in the magnitudes of L 1 and L 2 , as L 1 increases, the information user cares more about information quality and will want to commit to a higher decision-making threshold to induce more information quality control e¤ort. Which e¤ect dominates depends on the magnitude of dr dw
, that is, the sensitivity of the …rm's information quality control e¤ort to the choice of the decision-making threshold. Notice that the …rm doesn't directly care about the information user's payo¤: the …rst-order condition of the …rm's information quality control e¤ort reveals that dr dw is ampli…ed by
is large enough, the information quality control e¤ect dominates the direct e¤ect of decision making e¢ ciency, and the optimal decision-making threshold will increase with L 1 . Notice that an increase in L 2 unambiguously increases the decision-making threshold because both of the above two e¤ects -improving decision-making e¢ ciency and inducing more information quality control e¤ort -tend to increase L 1 .
Conclusion
This study has shown that when a …rm can control the quality of its reported …nancial information through noncontractible action, an accounting policy that aggregates raw information in a biased fashion can increase the quality of accounting information. Our analysis takes into account the endogenous nature of the information generation process. The accounting system, which functions as a classi…cation system in the presence of uncertainty, serves not only as an information aggregation scheme ex post but also incites …rms to improve their information quality ex ante. Comparative statics reveal that in equilibrium, the level of conservatism might even increase with the opportunity loss associated with being overly prudent (e.g., misclassifying a good …rm as being in an unfavorable state of a¤airs).
In this paper, we restricted the purpose of public reporting policy to mandating the disclosure of high-quality information. Our conclusions may not hold if the objectives of standardsetting include other considerations such as enhancing corporate control or facilitating litigation. Our study also relies on the assumption that the average preference of investors can be captured by the behavior of a representative investor. We do not study the more general setting where di¤erent types of investors intend di¤erent uses of the same accounting 
and
Proof of Proposition 1. (1 q (w; r) ) L 1 , the expression to be minimized in (8) .
(i) This obviously holds since
increases with y and equals 1 at y = m 2 .
(ii) Notice that
and decreases
Rearrange (11) and we get r h
For the above equality to hold, it must be true that
so the following must also be true: (iii) When r = 0, from (11), w =
< m constitutes a su¢ cient condition for w 2 (0; m) for any r 0. Straightforward mathematics reveals that this condition entails
o .
Proof of Corollary 1
PROOF. Let L r denote the derivative of the expected loss L with respect to r, then
(w m)h 
As a result
By Corollary 1,
In addition, condition (16) implies
Thus, at the point w = w (r), 
Proof of Proposition 3.
PROOF. The derivative of the private marginal bene…t B r = ( q r (1 )p r ) S with respect to w is
Now for any given h and w 2 (0; m), we have
Hence, by continuity, there exist h and an interval W (0; m) such that for all w 2 W ,
Now we show that this interval W expands as h increases. From (A1), we can rewrite B rw
For a given w, let b(h; w) denote the integrand in the above expression, that is,
Now the key to the proof is to show that (1 ) 1 2h
Denote the …rst term of the above expression by a 1 (h; w) and the second term by a 2 (h; w).
It's obvious that a 1 (h; w) > 0 8 h and w.
For a 2 (h; w) ; notice that at the point where b(h; w) = 0; that is,
so we must have
, (w m) 2 < w 2 , for b(h; w) = 0 to be satis…ed, it must be true that
, (w m) 2 > w 2 , for b(h; w) = 0 to be satis…ed, it must be true that
Thus, at b(h; w) = 0, a 2 (h; w) must be positive because relative to (A2) it always puts less weight on the negative part and more weight on the positive part. 
0.
Hence, when B rw 0, it must be true that
Therefore, an increasing h expands the interval W (0; m) over which B rw 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
PROOF. Note that
and by Corollary 2,
Thus, at the point
Therefore, L is decreasing in w at the ex post optimal w . In order to satisfy the …rst order
that is, ex ante commitment to conservatism is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 5
PROOF. Notice that the …rm's information quality control e¤ort choice is determined by (14) which is independent of L 1 and L 2 . The derivative of the …rst-order condition of the user's threshold choice with respect to L 2 evaluated at the original w , the original e¤ort level r , and the new L 2 is:
since p r > 0, p w > 0, and @r @w > 0. Therefore, the loss function decreases with L 2 at the original w , implying that the new threshold is higher than the original w .
The derivative of the …rst-order condition of the user's threshold choice with respect to L 1 evaluated at the original w , the original e¤ort level r , and the new L 1 is is large enough, the above expression is negative. Hence, by continuity, we …nd that the optimal decision w increases (decreases) with L 1 when S k is large (small).
Consider a decision making scenario with three states of nature and three action alternatives.
We assume that both the information user and the information originator have the same prior belief that all three states are equally likely. The information user's payo¤s (opportunity losses) for each state-action combination are shown in the table below:
Payo¤ Table   States 
Notice that action a i is the correct action to take when the actual state is i. Given state i, the opportunity loss, the di¤erence between the actual payo¤ (for a chosen action) and the best potential payo¤ increases the further away the chosen action is from the optimal action.
For example, the actions a 2 and a 3 can be thought of as capturing the degree of action beyond a simple yes/no decision (e.g., the "buy" and the "strong buy" recommendations issued by a securities analyst).
The information originator generates a signal y = x + , where N (0; h 1 ).
An ex post optimal decision then involves two threshold levels fw 1 ; w 2 g with w 1 < w 2 for the realized signal y: the information user would take action a 1 when y < w 1 , action a 2 when w 1 < y < w 2 , and action a 3 when y > w 2 .
Given w 1 and w 2 , let p ij , with i; j 2 f1; 2; 3g denote the probabilities of action a j being taken when the underlying state is i.
Then at w 1 , it has to be true that the information user is indi¤erent between taking action a 1 and a 2 :
Given the monotone likelihood property of the normal distribution, it is straightforward to verify that at such w 1 , the information user strictly prefers a 1 over a 3 .
Similarly, at w 2 , the information user is indi¤erent to taking action a 2 or a 3 (and strictly prefers a 2 over a 1 ):
It can be easily veri…ed that regardless of the signal precision, the ex post optimal decision rules are w 1 = m 2 and w 2 = 3m 2
. Notice that at these two thresholds p 11 = p 33 , p 21 = p 23 , and p 31 = p 13 ; and the two equations above are satis…ed.
The information originator is risk neutral and has linear utility over the actions of the information user. He obtains S i = + i when action a i is taken. Let S denote his expected utility given the common prior and the decision thresholds. Then Because at the ex post optimal w 1 and w 2 , p 13 = p 31 . The information originator's expected utility S remains constant at +2 regardless of information precision, and he has no incentive to improve the information quality.
Relative to the ex post optimal thresholds fw 1 ; w 2 g, an accounting system w w i for i 2 f1; 2g. The intuition that a little conservatism can tilt the information originator's preference toward more accurate information is analogous to that of a scenario with only two states of nature. An increase in w 1 increases p 31 and an increase in w 2 reduces p 13 , both resulting in lower expected utility S. However, the decrease in S would be less extreme if the signal were more accurate. For example, presume that h can take two values: with probability r, h = h, where 0 < h < +1, and with probability (1 r), h = h = +1. Then the information originator would have a strictly positive incentive to increase r; because when the information is more precise, his expected utility is less a¤ected by the thresholds fw 1 ; w 2 g :
It is also interesting to note that with three states of nature, aggregation could play a more signi…cant role in inducing information quality control e¤ort than a simple commitment mechanism. If we aggregate state 2 and state 3 by setting w and w 0 2 = +1, then p 13 0 regardless of h. Since p 31 decreases in h, the information originator would again have a positive incentive to improve information quality. Such aggregation will likely incur additional costs due to information loss (e.g., Ronen 1971 , Butterworth 1972 , Ijiri 1975 , Feltham 1975 ). The bene…t of aggregation due to the increase in the accounting information quality will need to be weighed against those added costs.
